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The events in Syria have led to mounting calls in the EU to impose an embargo 
on Syrian oil. Erik Mohns discusses the possible impact of such sanctions on the 
balance of power between the regime and the protest movement in Syria.  
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 arlier this week, press agencies reported that the EU has agreed to 
implement an embargo on Syrian oil. It is expected to be officially announced 
this Friday. The oil embargo would complement the so-far rather symbolic 
measures taken by the EU against the regime in Damascus. The entry ban on 
thirty of its members and the freeze of their financial assets in European banks 
could not be expected to have a substantive impact on the regime’s dealing with 
the protest movement. The embargo on Syrian oil should be seen in line with 
US president Obama’s earlier call on Bashar al-Asad to step down; it reflects the 
failure of the Turkish government and UN general-secretary Ban Ki-Moon 
efforts to convince Asad to halt the onslaught on protesters civilians, and the 
withdrawal of Arab Gulf states’ ambassadors from Damascus.  
For quite some time now, the protest movement inside Syria as well as the 
opposition outside has called for an oil embargo. According to some sources, 
one European state had up to now substituted its diminished amount of 
imported Libyan oil with Syrian petroleum, and thus opposing the 
implementation of an EU embargo. If these sources are correct, this government 
needed to be given sufficient time to conclude a favorable deal with another oil 
supplier before the EU’s oil embargo could be implemented. A return to the 
previous state of affairs in Syria finally seemed to have been ruled out as a 
possible future scenario by decision-makers in European capitals. 
The political objective of the oil embargo is to weaken an already challenged 
regime. According to some estimations, the revenue of exported oil ranges up 
to 30% of the Syrian regime’s revenues. European countries import up to 90% of 
all Syrian exported oil. At first glance, this punitive measure of an embargo 
seems promising to reduce the regime’s foreign assets and thereby to diminish 
its capability to pursue its violent campaign by reducing its power base. 
However, the impacts of sanctions and embargos are hard to foresee, as the 
Iraqi case in the 1990s has clearly demonstrated. In the case of Iraq, the embargo 
did discredit the UN in the local public, but ran counter to the consequences 
that were intended. Saddam Hussein was able to hold to power throughout the 
period of sanctions. In his latest television interview, Bashar al-Asad already 
gave a hint to a possible counter-strategy to an oil-embargo by announcing that 
Syria would turn towards the east. China and India, two energy-hungry powers 
that prevented a resolution against Syria to be brought into the UN Security 
Council, would probably not hesitate to substitute the European petroleum 
customers. This would render the effectiveness of EU’s oil embargo null and 
void and demand a more far-reaching approach. 
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What kind of intervention? 
After Gaddafi has been driven out of Tripoli by the rebels, with substantive 
support of NATO’s firepower (which western governments were not shy to 
emphasize), more and more voices are now calling for sketching out a similar 
scenario to support the Syrian uprising. There seems to be an urge among 
western policy-makers who feel compelled to do something in light of the 
continuation of atrocities inflicted by armed forces, mukhabarat and regime 
thugs on peaceful protesters in Syrian cities. The option of a military 
intervention has been ruled out since the uprising’s beginning, given that the 
large majority of the opposition in exile and the increasingly organized home-
based protest movement strictly rejected any outside interference; they is still 
confidence among the protesters to bring about the regime’s downfall through 
steadfastness and courage.  
Comparing the situation in Libya before NATO’s military engagement to the 
current situation in Syria is based on false premises. Contrary to Libya, the 
uprising in Syria was nonviolent from its start. The protest movement considers 
the continuation of this strategy its primary asset. Confronting the regime’s 
violent repression with non-violence renders the regime’s portrayal of the 
protesters as armed gangs and terrorists implausible and decreased 
continuously its legitimacy of rule in the eyes of the majority of Syrians. Calls 
for a no-fly zone or the protest movement to arms to defend itself, as uttered by 
a member of the exiled opposition last weekend, are isolated opinions that have 
been rejected by local committees organizing the protests on the ground. 
Furthermore, no territory has been ‘liberated’ from the regime’s reach so far, 
with the exception of Hama, the city in central Syria, which has been retaken 
violently by the Syrian army. A military intervention would not only go against 
the protest movement’s declared interest and be rejected from the 
overwhelming majority of all Syrians – protesters and regime-supporters alike. 
It would lead to a further complication of the current stand-off between the 
regime, its supporters and the protest movement and possibly cause spill-over 
effects into the region that are neither in the interests of the western states, nor 
of their regional partners. 
Adding to the dilemma in which the western states perceive themselves 
towards the Syrian uprising is that additional economic sanctions could run 
counter to the intended support of the protesters. The extension of economic 
sanctions by the US in mid August had further complicated the organisation of 
protests on the ground and infuriated members of the local coordination 
committees. US dollars cannot be withdrawn anymore with credit cards from 
ATMs in the country. Without this hard currency available, technical 
equipment that is needed to upload videos to the internet cannot be smuggled 
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anymore from neighboring countries into the Syria. It might limit in the longer 
run the urban entrepreneurs’ ability to import goods by stripping them of 
foreign currency, the intention that seems to be behind this punitive measure. 
However, the western countries should aim to coordinate their policy measures 
with the increasingly organized local committees in order not to weaken their 
already fragile position. A slow down of the protests would allow the regime to 
continue its strategy of denial, mere announcement of political reforms and 
repression. 
The possible extension of economic sanctions by the EU that target Syrian 
corporate business, entrepreneurs and merchants with the intention to rally 
them behind the protests and to join the calls for the regime’s downfall is risky. 
So far, their majority, in particular in Damascus and Aleppo, have refrained 
from entering the ongoing struggle. Their posture is increasingly interpreted by 
the protest movement and opposition as granting support to the regime’s 
action. The oil embargo has no immediate effect on them, because its revenue 
flows directly into the regime’s purse. However, the economic downturn 




How to support the protest movement? 
Given the pattern with which the Syrian regime has responded to diplomatic 
initiatives from outside powers throughout the crisis, even of former befriended 
states, it will likely frame an imposed oil embargo as another element of impe-
rialist powers’ grand strategy to take control of the Arab ‘beacon of resistance.’ 
It is to be expected that it will pursue a policy that aims to have the population 
shoulder its impact to make that claim credible. An extension of economic sanc-
tions by the EU should thus be preceded by spelling out clearly its political ob-
jectives, as Peter Harling of International Crisis Group recently suggested. The 
regime’s representations could be pre-emptied and countered via a direct ap-
peal to the Syrian people. Its final objectives should be to weaken the regime’s 
capabilities of repressing peaceful protesters, but first and foremost it should 
demonstrate to entrepreneurs and businessmen of Damascus and Aleppo that 
the incumbent regime has no future. It should be clarified that a transformation 
of the political order could entail potential for economic development and 
doesn’t involve only risks, but also economic chances. 
 
What's next? 
An end of the protests in the nearby future does not seem likely. For the 
activists, who are most afraid of a regime that would be no longer challenged 
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by protests, a point of no return has been reached. The regime does not possess 
sufficient resources of coercion to suppress all protests throughout the country 
simultaneously. Their forces have been stretched from the uprising’s beginning, 
implicated by the substantive deployment of the infamous shabiha, armed gangs 
of thugs created from civilian regime supporters and smuggling networks with 
kinship ties to the ruling family. It radically transformed the regime’s power 
base, making its claim to power increasingly dependent on intelligence 
apparatus and irregular forces. Its symbolic capital is already exhausted. In face 
of the violent repression and widespread killing of civilians, the portrayal of 
Bashar al-Asad as reformer and upholding the resistance to Israel and U.S. 
hegemony has turned into a farce. More and more Syrians and Syrian-
Palestinians compare the regime’s actions with the occupation regime in the 
Palestinian territories, judging its action to be worse. The days of souriyah al-
asad (Asad’s Syria) were counted when the first posters of Asad were torn down 
from walls and his father’s statutes knocked over. This symbolic ‘desecration’ 
changed Syrian body politics when the omnipresent fear was overcome. The 
regime, as no political ruler, can base its rule solely on continuous violent 
repression. But its final demise might take longer. The EU member states might 
contribute to its acceleration by implementing wise sanctions and exert 
diplomatic pressure that supports the brave activists in Syria. Any other option 
seems to be off the table, given Syria’s position in the Middle Eastern security 
system and the regional spoiler potential that the regime is able to unleash. 
  
